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NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

L'année philosophique. Publiée sous la direction de F. PILLON : Treizième année, 1902 : Paris, Félix Alcan, 1903.— pp. 308.

Besides the customary summary of the French philosophical literature of the year, with which its distinguished editor has enriched the review, this number contains four contributions, each possessing a peculiar interest. M. Pillon treats of Bayle's critique of the metaphysical attributes of God, infinity and unity, and sets forth his own views of these attributes. M. Hamelin discusses reasoning by analogy, taking particular account of the definitions of analogical reasoning proposed by Kant, Cournot, Mill, and Rabier, and arriving at his own conception in the course of a careful criticism. M. Dauriac presents a study on the conception of the Absolute in immanent metaphysics, criticising the main theses of the successors of Kant, founded on the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. M. Victor Brochard, finally, has here given a most admirable essay on Plato's *Laws* and the theory of Ideas, to which we shall address our particular attention, because of its intrinsic value and its especial interest at this time as marking the reaction against views but recently greeted with much enthusiasm.

Lutoslawski's *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, which was received upon its publication with so much favor even by scholars of distinction, is now rather tardily provoking a growing protest. The deluge of Platonic literature, written largely by those whose knowledge of Plato is limited and whose interpretation is of the piece-meal, literal-minded kind, invited the production of such a summary as Lutoslawski offered. But it was hardly to be expected that men who read Plato's thought rather than his language, and grasped the logic of the exposition of his doctrine, should long postpone the inevitable reply. Among the scholars who may lay just claim to an understanding of Plato, M. Victor Brochard is deserving of honorable mention.

The main thesis of Lutoslawski is that Plato in his latest works abandoned the realism of the theory of Ideas, and adopted a conceptualism essentially anticipating Descartes and Kant. Indeed, according to Lutoslawski, it would perhaps be fair to say that Plato's "real object is to eliminate the self-existent Idea altogether," as Professor Shorey expresses it (*The Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 33, n. 216). Against this thesis, M. Brochard directs his attack, showing that the Platonic dialectic and the doctrine of Ideas are distinctly assumed in Plato's latest work, the *Laws*.

M. Brochard begins by clearly characterizing the aim and scope of the *Laws*, showing that these, as well as the personality of Clinias and Megil-

lus, the interlocutors of the Athenian stranger (compare Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 87), exclude metaphysical problems (pp. 5 ff.), and that, when Plato chances to touch upon a fundamental question (as, *e. g.*, 859 B ff.), he does it, so to speak, in self-defence (p. 8 ff.). M. Brochard then proceeds to consider in detail the following passages : 668 C ff.; 859 B ff.; 892 D ff.; 818 B ff.; and the close of Book xii.

The reference to dialectic at 965 B ff. is unmistakable (compare also Shorey, *ibid.*, pp. 86 ff. and no. 662), if one bears in mind the similar instructions of the *Republic* and the words of Plato in *Meno* 74 A and *Protagoras* 329 C. Indeed, the manifest relation of the *Laws* to the *Republic* as a whole is in itself conclusive ; for Plato, in his later treatise on legislation, does not retract the earlier theory, but merely endeavors to adapt it to the frailties of human mind and character.

M. Brochard also calls attention (p. 15, note) to the inconsistency of Lutoslawski in regarding the Ideas now as conceptions of the human understanding and now as thoughts of God, justly remarking that the latter view first appears among the Neo-Platonists. The attempt to represent Plato rather than Aristotle as the originator of the science of logic is likewise properly rejected (pp. 16 ff.).

The author suggests a classification of the dialogues of Plato in three groups (p. 16) : the first deals with the Ideas, or, if you please, the problem of *Being* ; the second has to do with the problem of *Participation* ; the third, with that of *Becoming*. No effort is made to elaborate the suggestion, but it needs only to be stated to be accepted, however much difficulty may be met in the assignment of particular dialogues to these groups. I prefer to state the same view somewhat differently. In his first period, Plato was concerned with the Socratic quest of the Idea, as of something fixed and stable, in opposition to the teachings of the flowing philosophy, whether in logic, in psychology and ethics, or in metaphysics ; in the second, he endeavored to relate the Ideas to each other and to establish a *modus vivendi* between them ; in the third and last, he made an heroic effort to mediate the Ideas to the world of sensuous reality, whether in ethics (*Republic*, *Philebus*, *Laws*) or in matters physical (*Timæus*).

M. Brochard concludes his essay with these words : " Tout ce que nous nous sommes proposé dans le présent travail, c'est de montrer que, dans sa vieillesse, Platon n'a pas désavoué les doctrines de son âge mûr ; il est demeuré fidèle à lui-même. On pourrait faire le même travail pour les dialogues de la même période, pour le *Timée* et le *Philèbe* notamment. La conclusion serait la même et on retrouverait ainsi, d'un bout à l'autre de l'œuvre de Platon, cette unité que le philosophe cherchait en toutes choses, qu'il considérait comme le principe de toute perfection et qu'il ne séparait pas du bien lui-même." What M. Brochard here says might be done was indeed being done, even as he wrote, by Professor Shorey in his splendid study entitled *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, to which occasional reference was made above. These two essays, appearing together, admirably

supplement each other, and give us ground for the hope that Plato will soon be restored to us with a deeper and fuller appreciation of the essential harmony of his central doctrines at all periods of his thinking.

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Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Philosophie und Lebensanschauung. Von RUDOLF EUCKEN. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1903. — pp. 242.

This collection of essays by Professor Eucken is divided into two main parts. The first group deals with morals and views of life, the second with problems of religion and of its philosophy. The first group is again divided into essays that deal with general questions, and essays that concern personalities.

The first essay in the first group is entitled "A Vindication of Morals." Professor Eucken shows the great influence that moral ideas have exerted in history, selecting the cases of Plato, the Stoics, primitive Christianity, the Reformation, and Kant, as illustrations of the concomitance of an emphasis on moral ideas with a deepening of spiritual insight. On this historical basis, the author argues for the creative spirit-freeing power of moral ideas, and points out the need, in the face of the present tendency to reduce morals to social custom, of a renewed emphasis on those inner and spiritual tendencies in the individual life to which morality bears witness. In the next two essays, on "The Moral Impulses in the Life of the Present" and on "The Inner Movement of Modern Life," the failure of social custom and public opinion to furnish adequate guidance for the higher life is further insisted upon, and the present divorce between the soul of civilized man and the complex mechanism of his outer life and work is made the ground for a demand for the earnest search and discovery in man of a spiritual world, which is more than merely human, and which will heal the breach between the spirit and the outer labors of our civilization. In the fourth essay, "A Speech in Celebration of the New Century," delivered at Jena, Professor Eucken connects, in a very interesting manner, the ideas and problems brought out in the previous essays with the history and present duty and destiny of the University of Jena as a center of humane and spiritual culture. The fifth and last essay in the first section is an argument for the preservation of Finnish nationality from the significance of small nations as embodiments of historical and spiritual individualities.

In section B, "Relating to Personalities," the essays of most general interest are on "Aristotle's Judgment on Man," "Goethe and Philosophy," and "Fichte and the Problems of our Time." In the latter essay the author shows very forcibly and clearly the pertinency of the elder Fichte's doctrine to the moral and spiritual problems sketched in the first section, and the saving value of his ethical philosophy of nationality in the face of present tendencies towards a materialistic and chauvinistic conception of